The Economist fairly recently wrote an article that falsely claims China is losing interest in the west, because people in China are losing interest in English, grossly misinterpreting those individuals’ motivation. Rather than rejecting English, China is moving towards a model of using specialized professional linguists with high quality English, rather than low quality universal education. My interpretation is that The Economist’s writers viewed China through the colonialist mindset that has been labeled “Linguistic Imperialism” by scholars, which is the idea of extending cultural influence by getting everyone in a region to learn your language. The Economist wrongly concludes that China rejecting linguistic imperialism is equated with rejecting English and the West.
Evidence from national policy in China shows that China’s interest in English is increasing, not decreasing. Specifically, in the past 15 years, the number of schools teaching Chinese<>English translation at the master’s level increased by 2,000% (MOE/Baidu data). If China were truly disinterested in English education, why would it massively ramp up training people who are spending 100% of their time working as English language specialists? Instead of engaging with this contradiction, The Economist simply omits it from the narrative.
Moreover, the reporting even ignores The Economist’s own reporting on China that claims learning Mandarin Chinese is pointless because everyone in China knows great English. “False Eastern Promise” argued that that because Chinese people are so very interested in learning English, going to China, learning Mandarin, or professionally engaging in China is a waste of time. In my own recent commentary on this phenomenon last year, as of 2024, I focused on how an overriding expectation to use English means that business people will intervene to make you stop using Chinese and possibly use their power to achieve that demand. Therefore, without change from China, learning Mandarin would have no value. Some China bloggers even commented on a language power struggle phenomenon in China.
This year, The Economist focuses very much on their shocking experience that government workers at airports were refusing to speak English with travelers. Instead, they were using translation apps and tools. These journalists concluded that this and many other facts, mean that China is losing interest in engagement with the West generally. When analyzing this fact, the journalists seemed oblivious to the Guangdong Foreign Studies University’s intensively funded research program on the use of trained artificial intelligence programs to facilitate and increase foreign engagement. Research done there found that use of these programs increases cross-cultural engagement, and policymakers were advised that they should adopt the technology to increase motivation to be engaged with foreign persons. A particularly glaring oversight by The Economist was failing to address the contradiction between its previous conclusion that universal English adoption makes it pointless to learn Chinese, and fails to recognize that having this kind of national policy may not actually be in China’s best interest.
China’s Direction is Logical Here
A logical and ideal cross-cultural engagement program for China is not to have the entire population memorize the English dictionary as was done in the past, but rather to have a small cadre of highly trained specialists using the technology and making strategic decisions based on deep knowledge of this particular language. For example, Walgreens has phone medical interpreters online for whenever a customer needs it. In low risk cases, an AI under the direct control and supervision of a linguist can effectively handle routine cross-cultural engagement needs, while summoning the online linguist to help with tasks the AI is unprepared for. Concentrating superior English education on professionals who will focus on this one skill, rather than spreading resources thin among millions of students, is a classic division of labor strategy. Moreover, rising interest in teaching languages such as Spanish, Arabic, and Urdu, can allow higher quality engagement with a variety of other countries.
If The Economist had read what China’s President, Xi Jinping, said in various directives to the administration as published in newspapers, they would see that he has recently both advocated for enhanced focus on Mandarin Chinese and simultaneously more vigorous cross-cultural engagement.
This also shows interest in increasing China’s engagement with the UK and other countries, but not through dictionary memorization, but through Mandarin-language debate with Britons about bilateral relations and politics. For example, Duke student Christine Gerbode wrote about debating Chinese on Democracy, in Shanghai and engaging local opinions and viewpoints.
Moreover, cross-cultural relationships occurring in Mandarin Chinese are more likely to be authentic and fully understood, if given a chance to occur, because language learners of Chinese will have easy direct access to native speakers. Most learners of English have limited contact with American or British society, and some Americans visiting China have even reported being mobbed by crowds of people wanting to get English practice in. That kind of isolation has led to the development of grossly distorted versions of English throughout the world, in particular Chinglish, which is fundamentally the result of what happens when a language is used on a large scale with no native speakers present.
Having norms where everyone must speak English has also resulted in a number of bizarre practices in the US-China relationship. Chief among them is the frequently noted phenomenon that China experts generally can’t actually speak Chinese. As a result, there is an echo chamber of China related misinformation resulting from people largely pretending to be experts. In China, the phenomenon is entrenched, with a great example being where the genuine China expert Peter Hessler who wrote many acclaimed books on China, was invited to teach at Sichuan University—as an English writing teacher. This is someone who has no credentials in ESL, and whose career is 100% about researching China.
Then a scandal broke. Hessler kept writing and being paid for articles about China. However, under China law and university rules, a professor is only allowed to work specifically within the authorization of their visa documents, so Hessler could legally teach English at Sichuan University, or teach seminars at other schools, but his working as a China researcher and publishing magazine articles, was illegal under Chinese law and the university rules. The media reported that Hessler was also fired shortly after publishing paid articles, which is what school rules and the law require. But can we stop for a minute and consider why it was, at the time, an incredibly stupid policy to mandate within the entire expanse of Chinese-speaking territory “all China experts must stop and be English teachers only”?
Summary & Conclusion
In this article, I’ve argued that The Economist made false inferences about trends in China’s engagement with the west, based on a limited selection of evidence that fits their conclusion. The facts are however that Chinese policymakers have advocated for a more equal cultural relationship with the English-speaking world. That’s a relationship where westerners are learning and using Mandarin Chinese, and it’s not a universal obligation for all Chinese to master English. I also recognize The Economist and the China experts they read, do top-tier work in their fields and remain the best sources for information about China. I think the underlying problem for why The Economist is wrong about China in this case, has to do with the difficulty China Experts and journalists have with spending a lot of time in China and really getting to know the country and what’s going on there. It has to do with the lack of foreigners who’ve escaped the expat bubble who know what western journalists might be interested in, who could provide good leads on stories.
Those are problems that could be remedied by good policy and better partnership. What’s clear is that distorting the facts about what’s going on in China is not good for the English speaking world and it’s not good for China. Something urgently needs to be done to bridge the language and culture gap–and it’s not more English education, it’s going to be genuine engagement with China.
